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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of 
law that no genuine issue of material fact existed precluding 
summary judgment in favor of respondent Arnica? 
2. Did the trial court err in striking the affidavits 
submitted by appellant in opposition to respondent's motion for 
summary judgment and motion to strike appellant's pleadings? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 24 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court determine the outcome of 
this appeal. Due to the length of these provision, the text of 
each is set out in Appendix A of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In July, 1981, an accident occurred involving a 1980 
Dodge Mirada automobile owned by defendant Carl F. Schettler. The 
vehicle was insured under a policy issued by plaintiff Arnica 
Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Arnica"). As a result of 
the damages sustained in the accident, Schettler's vehicle was 
taken to Pioneer Dodge in Salt Lake City for repairs. (Record at 
2, 3, 10-15, 28-48A, and 51-58.) Arnica thereafter made payment in 
full for collision repairs to Schettler and the lienholder on the 
1980 Mirada, Chrysler Credit Corporation. (Record at 3, and 
715-73. ) 
Schettler later took the automobile from the premises of 
Pioneer Dodge without Pioneer's authorization and without paying 
Pioneer Dodge for the repairs to the vehicle. (Record at 715-7 and 
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1174.) Following the unauthorized taking of the car by Schettler, 
Wayne Schoenfeld, Manager of Pioneer Dodge, had the vehicle 
repossessed from Schettlerfs home in Salt Lake County. (Record at 
715-7 and 1174.) Although disputed by Schettler, the Manager of 
Pioneer Dodge, Wayne Schoenfeld, testified that within "one or two 
days" after retaking possession of the vehicle, he received a 
telephone call from Schettler wherein Schettler identified himself 
as "Carl" and asked whether or not Pioneer Dodge had his 
automobile. Schoenfeld responded, "Carl, you know we have your 
car," to which Schettler responded by hanging up. (Record at 
1174.) Shortly after receiving this telephone call from 
Schettler, Wayne Schoenfeld received a letter dated June 11, 1982, 
from Schettlerfs then attorney, J. Harold Call, requesting to 
negotiate the release of the automobile from Pioneer Dodge. 
(Record at 715-74 and 1174.) 
On June 9, 1982, Schettler reported his car as having 
been "stolen." On that same day, he filed a stolen vehicle report 
with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department. (Record at 715-75.) 
Later, on June 22, 1982, Schettler made a written claim with Amica 
for the alleged "stolen vehicle" loss. (Record at 715-75.) 
On July 8, 1982, Amica issued its Draft No. 1824946 in 
the amount of $6,925.00 payable to Carl F. Schettler and Chrysler 
Credit Corporation in satisfaction of the total loss claimed by 
Schettler for his "stolen vehicle." (Record at 715-77.) Schettler 
received, accepted and negotiated the draft as a complete 
settlement of his claim. In return, Schettler submitted to Amica 
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the title for the 1980 Dodge Mirada. (Record at 715-78.) By notice 
dated October 26, 1982, Schettler was advised that his insurance 
with Arnica was cancelled, effective November 8, 1982. (Record at 
383-412 and 715-79.) The contract of insurance between Arnica and 
Schettler terminated no later than November 10, 1982. No 
extension was requested by defendant and no reinstatement was ever 
issued. (Record at 383-412.) 
Nearly two months after the termination of the contract 
between Arnica and Schettler, Arnica's representatives received 
notice from Detective Gary Mortensen of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Department that the "stolen" vehicle had been located. 
(Record at 351-357.) At the time Arnica first learned of the 
vehicle's location, it had been sold or was in the process of 
being sold to a bonafide purchaser at a public auction held by 
Pioneer Dodge. (Record at 351-357, 1174.) Arnica attempted to 
forestall the public sale, but was too late. (Record at 1151.) 
Thereafter, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department 
investigated Schettler's conduct in relation to the submitting of 
an insurance claim for the alleged "stolen" vehicle. (Record at 
715-80.) The investigation was commenced by the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Department upon its own initiative, rather than at the 
request of Arnica or any other party to this action. (Record at 
358-359.) The investigation was protracted in part due to an 
unrelated automobile accident and resulting injuries to the chief 
investigating officer, Detective Gary Mortensen. Eventually, 
Detective Mortensen requested a screening with the Salt Lake 
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County Attorney's Office and was seen by Deputy County Attorney 
Neal Gunnerson. (Record at 1150.) Neal Gunnerson vaguely recalls 
the screening with Detective Mortensen, and has stated that he is 
certain that he did not decline to prosecute the matter, but 
believes that in all probability he recommended that Mortensen 
obtain additional evidence regarding the alleged insurance fraud. 
(Record at 1150.) After completing his investigation and 
obtaining additional information, Detective Mortensen later 
submitted the evidence at a screening with Deputy County Attorney 
Ernest Jones. (Record at 715-145 to 148, 1150 and 1159.) 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Jones concluded from 
that screening that sufficient evidence existed to warrant filing 
charges for insurance fraud against Schettler. This decision was 
an independent prosecutorial decision, without any influence, 
pressure or communications from Arnica or any other party to this 
action. (Record at 715 and 1159.) Shortly thereafter, an 
independent magistrate duly executed a warrant for Schettler's 
arrest on the charge of insurance fraud. [Record at 715-80.) 
Following Schettlerfs arrest for insurance fraud, a 
preliminary hearing was held at which probable cause was found for 
the charge of insurance fraud and Schettler was bound over for 
criminal trial. (Record at 715-81 to 715-118.) 
The criminal trial on the insurance fraud count against 
Schettler resulted in a jury verdict of "not guilty." (Record at 
52. ) 
The instant action was commenced by Arnica on April 1, 
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1985, seeking return of the $6,925.00 paid to Schettler, and 
punitive damages. (Record at 2-6, 28-35.) Schettler first filed 
a counterclaim against Amica on June 7, 1985, alleging essentially 
the same theories as contained in his amended counterclaim of 
December 4, 1985. (Record at 10-15, 51-58.) Considered in a 
light most favorable to Schettler, his amended counterclaim 
alleges the following theories of recovery against Amica: 
(a) Insurer bad faith; 
(b) Malicious prosecution; 
(c) Abuse of process; 
(d) Defamation (libel and slander); 
(e) Conversion; 
(f) Intentional infliction of emotional distress; and 
(g) Negligence. 
(Record at 51-58.) 
On or about June 4, 1986, plaintiff moved pursuant to 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment 
to dismiss the counterclaim of Schettler. (Record at 338-339.) 
Simultaneous with the filing of the motion for summary judgment, 
Amica also moved the court for an order striking Schettlerfs 
pleadings, including answers, counterclaims, and third-party 
compliants, and entering a default judgment in favor of Amica on 
Arnica's claims. (Record at 340-342.) The motion to strike was 
sought on the ground that the misconduct of Schettler and his 
attorney during the discovery process was so egregious as to 
warrant the striking of his pleadings. (Record at 360-382.) 
Defendant resisted Arnica's motions by submitting various 
affidavits. (Record at 520-547, 602-603 and 681-682.) Amica 
thereafter moved pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure to strike defendant's affidavits on the ground that the 
affidavits were not made on personal knowledge. (Record at 
672-675.) 
On October 31, 1986, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
granted Arnica's motion for summary judgment, dismissing 
Schettler's counterclaim, and granted Arnica's motion to strike 
Schettler's affidavits, while reserving ruling on Arnica's motion 
to strike Schettler's pleadings as sanctions for discovery abuses. 
(Record at 722-725.) Schettler now appeals from the final order 
awarding summary judgment and dismissing his counterclaim and 
third-party claims against Arnica and the other parties to this 
action. (Record at 771-773.) The notice of appeal does not 
challenge that portion of Judge Moffat's order striking Schettler's 
affidavits. (Record at 771-773.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTj 
The trial court did not err in granting Arnica's motion 
for summary judgment, dismissing Schettler's counterclaim and 
third-party claims against Arnica and the other parties to this 
action. The striking of the affidavits submitted in opposition to 
Arnica's motions was in accordance with Rule 56(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requiring affidavits to be made on 
personal knowledge. 
Defendant has failed to present any evidence in the 
record from which this court can determine whether there has been 
error. Where an appellant fails to present a record from which an 
appellate court can determine whether there has been error. 
-6-
failure to do so results in affirmance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT'S STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
OF THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF AMICA IS LIMITED TO THOSE ERRORS 
SPECIFICALLY CITED AND SUPPORTED IN 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
The general standard that an appellate court applies in 
reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion is the 
same as that employed initially by the trial court under Rule 
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Durham v. Margetts, 
571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). See also, Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 
27 Hawaii 113, 551 P.2d 163 (1976); Hunter v. Farmers Ins. Group, 
554 P.2d 1239 (Wyo. 1976); Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 
1976). The standard under U.R.C.P. 56(c) is that a summary 
judgment is proper when it appears "that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." See also, Thornock v. Cook, 604 
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). 
Amica successfully showed in the court below that 
defendant's counterclaim against it was not well founded in law or 
in fact. Arnica's motion for summary judgment was supported by 
various affidavits based upon the personal knowledge of the 
affiants. (Record at 715-145 to 715-198.) Based upon those 
affidavits and the legal arguments respecting defendant's causes 
of action against Amica, the trial court correctly ruled that 
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that Amica 
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was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on defendant's 
counterclaim. 
The rule governing summary judgment requires that where 
affidavits are proffered in support of a motion for summary 
judgment, the non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading" to create an issue of 
fact. U.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Defendant attempts to obtain reversal of the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment against him without reference 
to any portion of the record to show there was in fact error by 
the trial court. Rather, defendant relies on the mere allegations 
as contained in his counterclaim. Defendant's brief fails to cite 
to any deposition testimony, answers to interrogatories, 
affidavits, or other portions of the record setting forth specific 
facts in support of his claim that the trial court committed error. 
This court has consistently held that allegations or denials in 
pleadings are not sufficient basis for opposing summary judgment 
on the trial court level, or for seeking reversal of a ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment on the appellate level. See, Hall v. 
Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 
at 936. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 
251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960), was asked to review the granting of 
summary judgment in an action brought by purchasers of several oil 
wells to recover damages for alleged fraud, deceit, and breach of 
a fiduciary relationship. The defendant moved to dismiss and for 
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summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was supported 
by deposition testimony and sworn testimony given at the trial of 
a related matter. The plaintiffs did not explain or controvert 
that evidence by counter-affidavit or otherwise. The trial court, 
accordingly, found that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact, and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that the trial court 
had erred in granting summary judgment against them. The Utah 
Supreme Court, upon reviewing the uncontradicted record made by 
the defendant in support of his motion for summary judgment at the 
trial level, stated: 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to provide a 
substitute for the regular trial of cases in 
which there are disputed issues of fact upon 
which the outcome of the litigation depends. 
And it should be invoked with caution to the 
end that litigants may be afforded a trial 
where there exists between them a bonafide 
dispute of material fact. However, where the 
moving party's evidentiary material is in 
itself sufficient and the opposing party 
fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when 
he is presumably in a position to do so, the 
court should be justified in concluding that 
no genuine issue of fact is present nor would 
one be present at the trial. 
Dupler, 351 P.2d at 636-637 (emphasis added). 
Arnica submits that defendant's failure to cite to any 
specific evidence in the record should be construed as an 
admission that no genuine issue of fact exists. In addition, 
Arnica maintains that it is entitled to judgment in its behalf on 
defendant's counterclaim as a matter of law. The substantive 
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legal arguments supporting the trial court's granting of summary 
judgment dismissing defendant's counterclaim against Arnica are 
discussed at length in Arnica's Memorandum in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. See Record at 715 to 715-229. The 
arguments and analysis of that memorandum are hereby incorporated 
by reference. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO SHOW ERROR IN THE 
RECORD CREATES A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF 
RESPONDENT AND WAIVES ANY OF THE CLAIMED 
ERRORS. 
As previously stated, appellant's brief fails to 
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact which 
would constitute error by the lower court in granting summary 
judgment. Appellant leaves the task to this court of searching 
the entire record to locate any such alleged error. The Utah 
Supreme Court has assumed the correctness of the judgment below 
when an appellant has failed to support his argument with 
citations to the record. In State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 
1982), the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault. 
The defendant appealed on the ground that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him, and that a pre-trial photograph lineup 
was so unduly suggestive as to deny him due process of law. In 
affirming the conviction, the court statedl: 
A separate and independent basis for the 
affirmance of the trial court is that the 
defendant failed to refer to any portion of 
the record that factually supports his con-
tentions on appeal. This court will assume 
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i 
the correctness of the judgment below if 
counsel on appeal does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as to making a 
concise statement of facts and citation of 
the pages in the record where they are 
supported. 
Id, at 756-757. This is precisely the situation in the case at 
bar. This court should likewise affirm. 
The California Court of Appeals has also recognized 
that the failure of an appellant to support his claims of error 
with appropriate citations to the record creates a presumption o 
correctness of the judgment below. In City of Lomita v. City of 
Torrance, 148 Cal. 3d 1062, 196 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1983), the court 
affirmed a ruling in part on the ground that adequate reference 
the record was not made on appeal to permit appellate review of 
the lower court's decision. The court stated: 
"The rule is well established that a reviewing 
court must presume that the record contains 
evidence to support every finding of fact, 
and an appellant who contends that some 
particular finding is not supported is required 
to set forth In his brief a summary of the 
material evidence upon that issue. Unless this 
is done, the error assigned is deemed to be 
waived. [Citation] It is incumbent upon 
appellants to state fully, with transcript 
references, the evidence which is claimed to 
be insufficient to support the findings. 
(McCosker v. McCosker (1954) 122 Cal. App. 2d 
498, 500 [265 P.2d 21].) It is neither 
practical nor appropriate for [a reviewing 
court] to comb the record on [an appellant's] 
behalf." (In Re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 
Cal. 3d 877, 887-88, 160 Cal. Rptr. 516, 603 
P.2d 881.) 
City of Lomita, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 542-543 (emphasis added). 
Rule 24(a)(7) and (e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
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Court requires appellants and respondents to make appropriate 
references in their briefs to the record below: 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order here indicated: 
* * * 
(7) A statement of the case* The state-
ment shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in 
the court below. There shall follow 
a statement of facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All 
statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record. 
(See Paragraph (e)). 
* * * 
(e) References in brief to the record. 
References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) . . . . 
(emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Uckerman v. Lincoln National 
Life Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978), in interpreting the 
predecessor rule to Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
recognized that the court need not, and should not, consider any 
facts not properly cited to the record. The plaintiff in Uckerman 
brought an action against the defendant insurer over the payment 
of certain life insurance proceeds. The insurer's motion for 
summary judgment was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court, in affirming the entry of summary judgment, 
noted: 
Appellant makes many immaterial factual alle-
gations that are not supported by the record 
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and has failed to cite those portions of the 
record that do support the material facts as 
is required by Rule 75(p)(2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This court need not, and will 
not, consider any facts not properly cited to, 
or supported by, the record. 
Id. at 144 (emphasis added). 
This court likewise in Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 
699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985), and Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 
359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952), refused to address claims of error where 
appellants failed to cite from the record to support their 
assertions. See also, State v. Cash, 727 P.2d 218 (Utah 1986); 
First National Bank v. Smoot, 72 Utah 215, 269 P. 518 (1928). 
Other jurisdictions have similarly refused to review 
assignments of error where an appellant fails to cite the court to 
any evidence in the record to support of the claimed error. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals in Adams v. Valley National Bank, 139 
Ariz. 340, 678 P.2d 525 (1984), found that an appellant's failure 
to cite to evidence in the record to substantiate his claims would 
result in dismissal of the appeal. The court noted: 
In a typical case when the court is confronted 
with a brief of this quality, we simply bite 
our tongues and endeavor to determine what 
argument has been raised on appeal and proceed 
to dispose of it. In most of these cases, the 
appellant's position is unfounded and the ruling 
below is affirmed in a memorandum decision. In 
truth, we do a disservice to everyone in such 
situations. A muddled brief generally reflects 
the fact that there is little basis for an appeal 
in the first place. The cliemt in a civil case 
ought to be advised of this unhappy truth and 
discouraged from proceeding. The bar is hindered 
in pressing forward cases with merit when the 
courts are forced to expend time on cases without 
merit. 
-13-
* * * 
We are not required to assume the duties of an 
advocate and search voluminous records and 
exhibits to substantiate an appellant's claims. 
Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz, at 414, 420 P.2d 
at 285. Sound judicial practice in our ever-
burgeoning docket prohibit us from carrying the 
banner on behalf of the ill-advised appellant. 
We should not be constrained to neglect the many 
meritorious appeals that are awaiting our 
decision by spending our time needlessly in 
an attempt to do the job of the lawyer. 
Adams, 678 P.2d at 527-528 (emphasis added). 
The California Court of Appeals in Niederer v. Ferreiara, 
189 Cal. 3d 1485, 234 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1987), affirmed a lower 
court's decision in part due to the appellant's failure to support 
his alleged claims of error with appropriate citations to the 
record. The court stated: 
Hampering our further review of [appellant's] 
contention is his failure to include the cross-
complaint and answer thereto in the record on 
appeal. We do not know the basis of his claim 
against the [respondents], so it cannot be 
determined whether the trial court ruled 
properly on the claim. It is an appellant's 
duty to present a record from which the 
appellate court can determine whether there 
has been error; failure to do so results in 
affirmance. 
Additionally, a reviewing court begins with the 
presumption that the record contains evidence 
sufficient to support the judgment, and it is 
an appellant's burden to demonstrate there is 
no substantial evidence to support the judgment. 
As stated in Grand v. Griesinger (1958) 160 
Cal. App. 2d 397, 403, 325 P.2d 475: "'It is 
encumbent upon appellants to state fully, with 
transcript references, the evidence which is 
claimed to be insufficient to support the 
findings. The reviewing court is not called 
upon to make an independent search of the 
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record where this rule is ignored. [Citation.]1 
A claim against sufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the findings, consisting of mere 
assertion without a fair statement of the 
evidence, is entitled to no consideration, 
when it is apparent, as it is here, that a 
substantial amount of evidence was received 
on behalf of the [cross-defendants].!" 
[Appellant] here does not refer in his brief 
to any of the evidence presented by the 
[respondents]; he does not demonstrate why it 
is legally or factually insufficient to support 
the judgment in their favor. This failure, 
along with the inadequate record, must be 
deemed to waive [appellant's] final contention 
on appeal. 
Niederer, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 794-795 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). See also, Adrian v. Lockridqe, 285 Ala. 222, 231 So.2d 
95 (1970) (failure to support assignments of error with 
appropriate citations to the record constitutes a waiver and 
abandonment of the claimed errors); Mast v. Standard Oil Co., 140 
Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137 (1984) (appellate courts should not have to 
search the record to find facts to defeat a summary judgment 
motion on appeal); Lashinshy v. Hoffmann, 3 Ariz. App., 411 P.2d 
467 (1966) (an appellate court may reject assignment of error 
absent specific references to the record supporting those 
assignments); Cecil v. Gila County, 70 Ariz. 320, 227 P.2d 217 
(1951) (appellate courts need not consider assignments of error 
without indications as to where in the record the errors may be 
found); Crider v. State, 115 Ga. App. 347, 154 S.E.2d 743 (1967) 
(appellate courts may refuse to consider issues on appeal not 
supported by references to the record); Leite v. Sambo's 
Restaurants, Inc., 264 Or. 498, 506 P.2d 176 (1973) (appellate 
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courts may refuse to address issues not supported by citations to 
the record); Robert v. Tennessee Wesleyan College, 60 Tenn. Ct. 
App. 624, 450 S.W.2d 21 (1969), (where an appellant fails to cite 
to the record where alleged assignments of error occurred, the 
error will not be considered on appeal). 
The failure of an appellant to reference claims of error 
to specific portions of the record substantiating those claims 
also imposes an unfair duty on the respondent. Arnica has received 
i 
no guidance from appellant's brief as to what facts he relies on 
in asserting the lower court committed error. Without such 
guidance, Arnica has been disadvantaged in the preparation of its 
brief. Under such circumstances, this court should find defendant 
to have waived or abandoned the claimed errors, and affirm the 
lower court's ruling. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS WERE PROPERLY STRICKEN 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Appellant's brief also asserts that the trial court erred 
in striking the affidavits submitted by him in opposition to 
Arnica's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike 
appellant's pleadings. It should be noted that defendant's notice 
of appeal fails to complain of that portion of Judge Moffat's 
order dated October 31, 1986. (Record at 771-773.) Furthermore, 
it should be noted that defendant has failed to point to any 
evidence in the record that those affidavits were based upon the 
personal knowledge of the affiants. Indeed, defendant neqlects to 
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even give the court any indication as to where the striken 
affidavits may be found in the record. Therefore, Arnica 
respectfully contends that any claim of error in the striking of 
those affidavits has been waived by defendant. 
In the event that defendant is not found to have waived 
or abandoned his right to claim error in regard to the striking of 
the subject affidavits, even a cursory review of those affidavits 
reveals that the affidavits contain heresay and opinion testimony 
clearly not within the personal knowledge of the affiants. See 
Record at at 672-675. As such, the affidavits submitted by 
defendant were insufficient to create an issue of fact. Treloggan 
v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); Williams v. Melby, 699 
P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); Western States Thrift and Loan Co. v. 
Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972). Furthermore, even 
if the stricken affidavits complied with the Rule 56(e) standard 
requiring statements based on personal knowledge, the affidavits 
are insufficient to defeat Arnicafs motion for summary judgment 
since they were directed primarily at defeating Arnica's motion for 
sanctions, rather than at the summary judgment motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments raised by appellant's brief are nothing 
more than in invitation for this court to hunt out something in 
the record to support his claims of error. Rule 24 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court requires that appellant make specific 
citation to the record for all statements of fact. Appellant's 
brief does not given this court nor respondent any indication of 
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what evidence appellant relies on in claiming that issues of 
material fact remain which would have thereby precluded the 
awarding of summary judgment in favor of Arnica. 
This court in reviewing the judgment by the lower court 
is necessarily limited in its scope of review to those errors 
which are identified by defendant and supported by citations to 
the record. Because defendant has failed to so direct this 
court's review, the presumption applies that no error can be 
demonstrated by the record. 
Additionally, defendant's failure to demonstrate facts 
within the record in support of claimed error creates a 
presumption in favor of affirmance and waives any claim of error. 
The judgment of the trial court granting Arnica's motion for 
summary judgment, dismissing defendant's counterclaim, and 
granting Arnica's motion to strike defendant's affidavits should, 
therefore, be affirmed. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By 
S. Baird Morgan 
Mark J. Taylor 
Stephen J. Trayner 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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APPENDIX A 
RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
* * * 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom 
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damage. 
* * * 
(e) Form of affidavit; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or 
served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed 
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as 
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provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavit or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, If appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
RULE 24, RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order here indicated: 
* * * 
(7) A statement of the case. The state-
ment shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in 
the court below. There shall follow 
a statement of facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All 
statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record. 
(See Paragraph (e)). 
* * * 
(e) References in brief to the record. 
References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) . . . . 
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Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: 
Dear Sir: 
Appeal No. 880032-CA 
Arnica Mutual Insurance, et al., respondent 
v. Carl F. Schettler, appellant 
This letter is submitted pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. In that regard, the undersigned respect-
fully submits the following: 
1. 
2. 
CASE CITATIONS: 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
(filed December 11, 1987) 
Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 
838 (Utah App. 1987) 
BRIEF REFERENCE: 
The decision by this court in Koulis v. Standard Oil Co, 
pertains to respondent's brief submitted to the Utah Supreme 
Court (Utah Supreme Court Case No. 860621) , point II at pages 
10-16 of respondent's brief. 
The decision of this court in the Callioux v. Progressive 
Insurance Co. case pertains to the argument raised in point I 
of respondent's brief in the same appeal at pages 7-10 of said 
brief. 
3. REASONS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CITATIONS: 
Both the decisions in the Koulis and Callioux cases were 
rendered by this court subsequent to the filing of respondent's 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
April 13, 1988 
Page—2 
brief, are pertinent and arguably dispositive of the issues 
in the above-referenced appeal and may otherwise serve to 
inform the court relative to its decision in this matter. 
Thank you for your attention to these supplemental authorities. 
Very truly yours, 
STRONG & HANNI 
SBM/kl 
cc: Phil L. Hansen 
Wesley M. Lang 
Robert R. Wallace 
Enc. (copy of cases) 
